The Schizoid Society: Identity Fragmentation in the Algorithmic Age
As Jean Piaget argued in his developmental theory, a fundamental aspect of human maturation involves moving beyond an egocentric, infantile state and entering into meaningful social relations, what he considered an essential process of socialisation (Piaget, 1932). The transition from self-centred cognition to recognising others as agents in a shared social world marks the foundation of group affiliation and moral reasoning. In this sense, belonging to a group, a “tribe,” to borrow anthropological language, plays a formative role in identity construction and moral development.
However, the very groups that foster belonging are also underpinned by rules, norms, and symbolic boundaries (Douglas, 1966; Goffman, 1959). These frameworks are necessary for social order, but can also impose conformity, thereby curtailing individual autonomy. As Durkheim (1893) noted in his exploration of social solidarity, modern life generates tension between the collective conscience and the differentiated, autonomous individual. In contemporary society, this tension is increasingly visible in the rise of identity politics and performative affiliations, what might be called “flag politics,” where one’s public identity is mediated by symbolic gestures of allegiance to causes, ideologies, or communities, often in the absence of deep reflection or critical engagement.
This phenomenon is exacerbated by the pervasive influence of social media, which not only intensifies group dynamics, but also fosters an environment where the appearance of moral correctness becomes paramount. The public visibility of online activity, combined with the performative architecture of platforms such as Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok, compels users to cultivate personas that are often meticulously curated for social approval rather than authentic self-expression (Turkle, 2011). The fear of reprisal, or cancel culture, further inhibits dissent and critical thinking, replacing dialogical engagement with ideological conformity. As a result, individual thought risks being subsumed under the performative and often superficial demands of group identity.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the resulting disjunction between one’s internal self and externally projected persona can be understood through the lens of identity fragmentation. Freud’s (1923) model of the ego mediating between the id, superego, and external world is under new pressures in the digital age. The ego is now tasked with navigating not only social expectations in the immediate world, but also the omnipresent digital gaze. This hypervisibility contributes to what Lacan (1949) referred to as the “mirror stage,” a developmental phase wherein the self is constituted through identification with an image. In social media, users are constantly confronted with idealised versions of themselves and others, which may induce a state of méconnaissance, or misrecognition, further destabilising the ego.
Philosophically, this crisis of selfhood raises the question: are we becoming schizoid as a society, perpetually splitting between multiple versions of the self to meet contradictory social expectations? Deleuze and Guattari (1983), in Anti-Oedipus, describe capitalism’s tendency to “deterritorialise” identity, fragmenting it across flows of desire and commodification. The contemporary self, fractured by algorithmic surveillance and echo chambers, may exemplify precisely such a condition. Moreover, Baudrillard (1994) warned of a world dominated by simulacra, copies without originals, where authenticity is replaced by performance. In such a world, digital selves become not just edited versions of reality, but hyperreal constructs that obscure the possibility of genuine self-understanding.
The crisis may not solely lie in our digital entanglements, but in our inability to embrace self-acceptance within a culture that commodifies identity. If one cannot accept the self outside the logic of algorithmic affirmation, the recursive search for validation may never end. Escaping this cycle, however, is complex. Algorithms are not passive, they shape what we see, think, and ultimately, who we believe ourselves to be (Zuboff, 2019). To break free would require not only technological disengagement, but a philosophical reorientation toward what Charles Taylor (1991) calls an “ethics of authenticity,” a turn inward that reclaims the self as a moral and autonomous agent, rather than a collection of curated signifiers.
We might then ask whether social media is, in effect, generating unconscious cults, groups bound not by explicit dogma, but by unspoken codes of conduct, symbolic allegiance, and algorithmic indoctrination. These cults of identity operate below conscious awareness, using the very mechanisms of digital participation to reproduce conformity, exclude dissent, and manufacture belonging. Thus, what appears as freedom of expression may, paradoxically, conceal a deep psychological dependency on social affirmation.
References
Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1983). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge.
Durkheim, E. (1893). The Division of Labour in Society. New York: Free Press.
Freud, S. (1923). The Ego and the Id. London: Hogarth Press.
Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books.
Lacan, J. (1949). The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function. In Écrits. Paris: Seuil.
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Taylor, C. (1991). The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Turkle, S. (2011). Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other. New York: Basic Books.
Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books.